Moove's Exit Exposes Cracks in Nigeria's Ride-Hailing Credit Model

When Moove announced it was ending operations in Nigeria and transferring vehicle ownership to customers, two reactions emerged. A feel-good story spread on social media, celebrating a company thanking its users. But a harder question went unasked: why did one company’s exit take down another’s entire credit operation?

Founded in Lagos in 2020 by Ladi Delano and Jide Odunsi, Moove aimed to solve a real problem. Ride-hailing was growing, but most drivers couldn’t secure bank financing for vehicles. Moove’s Drive-to-Own model offered a practical solution: the company bought the vehicle, the driver used it on Uber, and repayments were deducted directly from weekly Uber earnings.

A Model Built on Borrowed Foundations

Moove initially structured its lending approach in Nigeria around Uber’s data. The company analyzed driver trip logs, pay records, service ratings, cancellation trends, and activity levels to assess creditworthiness without traditional credit checks. Over time, Moove broadened its criteria to include information from other ride-hailing services, vehicle performance metrics, background checks, and maintenance patterns.

Limiting drivers to Uber gave Moove a clean, verifiable record of income. Without Uber, there was no earnings data; without earnings data, there was no credit model; and without a credit model, there was no loan product.

On September 2, 2026, Uber stopped taking trips in Nigeria, ending a 12-year presence that began in 2014. Nigeria was one of Uber’s most important African markets and the continent’s most populous country. Moove’s loan book didn’t just shrink—it lost the foundation it was built on.

Problems with Moove’s Nigerian operations had been clear for some time. The company loaned money in dollars while drivers earned in naira, and the gap became worse after Nigeria ended fuel subsidies in mid-2023. That move caused fuel prices to spike and the naira to weaken, meaning drivers’ naira wages covered shrinking portions of their dollar debts each quarter.

The system lacked credit scoring and credible identity infrastructure. Repossession was the primary way to recover funds, but drivers who removed GPS trackers or stopped paying made even that difficult. Defaults were a structural feature, not an exception.

When Uber exited Nigeria, scattered defaults turned into a full-scale crisis. Every driver relying on the Moove-Uber model faced the same collapse of income at once. Suddenly, an undisclosed volume of loans had no reliable source of repayment.

Moove told drivers they could work on Bolt and inDrive, but these platforms don’t automatically share earnings data with third-party lenders. Moove would have needed to negotiate new data-sharing agreements, rework its collection and credit systems, and distinguish between real earnings shortfalls and drivers routing income through invisible channels. This would have required years of infrastructure work, and Moove chose a different path.

The Exit Strategy

The vehicle transfer is framed as a kind gesture, and it does reflect genuine goodwill. Moove claims over 9,000 Nigerian customers used its Drive-to-Own or rental services, generating about ₦57 billion in revenue. Handing over vehicles worth roughly ₦35 billion—free of charge and with no further obligations—starting October 1 is a significant move.

From a balance sheet perspective, what Moove held in Nigeria wasn’t truly an asset but a loan book secured against vehicles whose borrowers had lost their main income source. Collecting would have meant pursuing thousands of drivers who couldn’t pay through a slow and costly legal system, while the vehicles depreciated and the exchange rate worked against the underlying dollar exposure.

Handing over the vehicles turned a messy, likely unrecoverable receivables problem into a closed chapter. The drivers gained cars they were already using, Moove secured a clean exit and a brand-protecting story for its other markets, and its co-founder could truthfully say, “Nigeria will always be where Moove started,” without ever filing a collection action against the people who built his company.

Moove isn’t alone in relying on a single platform’s data for credit decisions. The issue isn’t that the Drive-to-Own model fails; it works well where credit systems are reliable, currencies are stable, and multiple platforms operate. Moove now manages about 42,000 vehicles across 29 cities worldwide and continues expanding elsewhere.

Moove began in Lagos in 2020 with 76 vehicles. By March 2024, Uber led its $100 million Series B, valuing the company at $750 million. Two and a half years later, Uber’s decision to leave Nigeria forced Moove out of the country, a neat irony.

Drivers Retain Ownership and Staff Receive Severance Gifts

Nigerian drivers who used Moove’s services now own their vehicles outright. This transfer of ownership benefits 9,000 drivers. Additionally, staff members are receiving cars as part of their severance packages. Ladi Delano acknowledges Nigeria’s significance as Moove’s starting point.